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Abstract: 
Wireless penetration and the Indian economy have grown significantly over the past 
few years, but how robust and sustainable is the adoption of wireless services and 
products? Several papers have discussed India as a wireless service and product 
market, and sometimes tried to assess quantitative attributes thereof. The present 
paper aims instead at looking, from a management point of view, at the unique 
underlying evolution processes, bottlenecks and risks. On specific facets, a 
comparison is given to adoption indicators in other key markets such as China. 
 
For example, just to illustrate highlights of these unique attributes , it is indeed 
surprising that such a major economy with its very large population has not yet 
achieved the wireless service usage and mobile terminal penetration ratios of neither 
an early European adopter ,nor of a recent large scale adopter like China or Russia . 
India has also been characterised by a surprising regulatory development process 
quite different from many other contexts, both in terms of its both centralised and 
regional structure, of very low tariffs providing almost no ROI to investors in a stable 
situation, and of absence of neutrality across communications technologies. At the 
same time, a very large fraction of the population has not , for affordability and 
regional coverage reasons,  been able to get the access opportunities of more 
developed regions , leading to a distribution unbalance which is also a significant 
opportunity .Also , the wireless service and product adoption pattern in India , specific 
to communication services , has so far been  in rather sharp contrast with the widely 
known software and outsourcing services industry evolutions in that country . 
 
 
Therefore it is important to compare the most relevant known wireless service and 
product adoption theories, to establish from facts whether they apply in the Indian 
context, and, if not, suggest new or mixed theories able to explain all such facts and 
cast some light into its likely future structural evolution. It is of high relevance in 
management to validate if indeed established models apply or not in a significant case 
like India, just as it is also of high relevance for the main stakeholders to identify 
methodology able to support their analyses. 
The paper first provides background information on wireless, fixed, and other 
operators, on wireless penetration, on telecommunications infrastructure and 
investments, and on Indian human capital. Thereafter is analyzed in detail the 
relevance, or not, of five traditional technology adoption models across the Indian 
user base: the absorption business model, the perceived benefits business model, 
consumer attitudes, the globalisation business model, and finally the brand 
management business model.  These first analyses are followed by the identification 
and detailed analysis of five other business models or structural processes, some 
rather unique to India: the two-tier migration model, large scale imported adoption 
without a telecommunications infrastructure & terminals industry, unstable adoption 
with lack of consistent public policies, knowledge sharing and productivity 
enhancement adoption model, and finally late foreign capital investments into a large 
emerging market. 
From the comparison of facts and background data , with these ten wireless service 
and product adoption models , the paper establishes which are not relevant, and which 
are too some degree . Furthermore the relevant business models are shown to share, 
further attributes of sustainability (or not) and dynamic behaviour. This allows 
concluding that India has had an overall quite fragile adoption and deployment path 
with growing tensions such as coverage, quality of service and affordability 
disparities. The model comparison also allows to diagnose the key three structural 
measures needed to reach a sustainable equilibrium from the business, economic and 
social points of view. 
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NOTE 
 
The reader familiar with the details of the Indian situation, or not wishing to have 
background details, can skip the BackgroundInformation  Section 0. and start with the 
Section 1 about the Goal of the paper. 
 
0. BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 
This Section summarizes background data on wireless penetration and operators, 
financials, teledensity and demographic structure.  
 
Table 1: MOBILE OPERATOR MARKET SHARES (Source: Telecom regulatory 
authority of India, June 2005); Total: 57, 37 M wireless users; Average wireless penetration 
(2005) : < 6 %; Approx growth: + 1, 6 M users/month 
 
MAIN WIRELESS OPERATORS  Capitalization on 
08 May 2006 
Market shares 
Bharti Airtel (Singapore Telecommunications 
Ltd. owns a 31% stake) 
17,4 BUSD 21,4 % 
Reliance Part of 
conglomerate 
20, 3 % 
BSNL (state owned)  100 % 
Government 
owned 
18,6 % 
Hutchison Essar (62 %-owned by Hutchison 
Telecommunications International Ltd. of 
Hong Kong) 
8,9 BUSD 14,7 % 
   
IDEA  9,7 % 
Others  15,3 % 
 
 
Wireless operators  
 
State owned fixed operator Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd BSNL is also the third largest mobile 
operator). BSNL which is the operator with widest coverage reaches 7000 towns and villages, 
far from the 650 000 villages in India. More than 90 % of the Indian subscribers have signed 
up since 2003. The other main fixed operator is Mahanagar Telephone Nigam (MTNL), 
which had on May 08, 2006 a market capitalization of 3.0 BUSD although it is partly 56 % 
state owned, and which also provides wireless service. 
 
The two state owned integrated operators BSNL and MTNL were considering a merger at 
the end of 2006. While BSNL operates in all of the country’s circles except Mumbai and 
Delhi, MTNL was set up primarily to provide fixed, mobile, and broadband access to the 
country’s two largest cities. The merger of these two telcos will create the largest telecom 
company in the country with It will result in the creation of a robust entity which the last-
mile advantage across the country, a stronger balance sheet, economies of scale, will 
control over 90% of the fixed-line market and around 18% of the wireless market with a total 
subscriber base of over 45m (as mid 2005). 
 
As a result of the National Telecommunications policy of 1999, were licensed  eight cellular 
wireless operators in four metropolitan areas, cellular operators in 18 state areas, six fixed 
communications operators in six state areas, and two paging operators in 27 cities and 18 
state areas (Telecommunications regulatory authority of India (TRAI) , 1999). In case of 
Very Small  Aperture  Terminal  (VSAT) satellite communications  ,  14  licenses  were  awarded  
out  of  which  only  nine  were made  operational (TRAI,1999) . The initial results in terms 
of wireless service adoption were not satisfactory as only 1million subscribers had 
subscribed to the cellular services, and operators suffered as these numbers fell   well short of 
projected targets (TRAI, 1999). As of 2006, there are still about 12 wireless operators, of 
which the main five ones are mentioned din Table 1, and there are five private fixed operators 
(in addition to state owned BSNL and MTNL). 
 
 
Wireless penetration  
 
When  the  National Telecommunications Policy of 1994 was  tabled, teledensity  in India 
was 0.8 per a hundred people in contrast with the world average of 10 (TRAI , 1994) ; it was 
also lower as compared to China, Pakistan, and Malaysia . 
Since then the growth has been significant with a teledensity of 7 reached in 
March 2004 (although the rural  teledensity was only 1,  7 reaching 522 000 
vil lages out of a total  of  620 000) (TRAI, 2005).  According to (TRAI’s ,April 
10th, 2006)  press release, gross telecom subscribers reached around 140 million telephone 
users, of which fixed subscribers are 49.5million and mobile subscribers, 90 million  .As of 
December 2005. teledensity  reached  11.43%,  of  which  mobile  (GSM  +  CDMA) services 
accounted for 6.95% and fixed services, including WLL  accounted for the rest (TRAI, 
April 2006) . But these figures are imbalanced because the urban teledensity is more than 
31% but only 2% in the rural areas (Light reading). As of Dec 2005, the market share of 
mobile  subscribers  in  metro  areas  is  about  25.98%,  in  Circles  A,  35.05%,  in  Circles  
B, 32.29%, and in Circles C, 6.68% (TRAI, April 2006) ,  In the rural areas, more than 
14.18 million phones had been provided, but this pales in comparison to the 35 million 
phones in urban areas (TRAI , April 2006). 
  
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the Department of Telecommunications 
(DoT) and the Wireless Planning Commission (WPC) have recommended in 2005 actions to 
take in order to ensure that India achieves a goal of 250m telephone lines by the end of 
2007, of which 200m are expected to be mobile or fixed-wireless, and representing a 
growth of 150 M subscribers compared to 2004. This would represent by the end of 
2007 a teledensity of 22 %.To achieve this aggressive growth target, mobile operators 
would need to add, at the very least, 4m subscribers per month for a period of 36 months 
since 2004 . 
 
Telecommunications infrastructure and investments 
 
According to the Economic Survey of India 2005-2006, the telecommunications 
infrastructure deficit continues to haunt India (Government of India, 2005). It has been 
estimated that India has the potential to absorb US$150 Billion of foreign direct  
investment (FDI) over  2005-2010 in the infrastructure sector alone (Government of India, 
2005).  As  far  as  foreign ownership in the telecommunications sector  is concerned  the 
ceiling  has  been  raised  from  49% from 1999 to 2005,   to  74%  in  certain  areas  such  as  
basic, cellular,  unified  access  services,  national/international  long  distances,  VSAT,  
PMRTS , Internet service providers with gateways  (Government of India , 2005) . A total of 
Rs. 41,551 core FDI was approved  for  the  telecom  sector  through  Sep  2005  ;  Hutchison,  
SingTel,  AT&T  and Distacom are the major investors. Furthermore, since the first five-year 
national plan (1951), the  government  has  allocated  3.5%  of  national  outlays  to  the  
communications  industry  on average  (Indiastat) .  Since  Aug  1991  to  Sep  2005,  the  
telecommunications  sector  has  attracted  a cumulative inflow of Rs. 12,076 crore (US 
$2,863 Million), which amounts to 9.60% of the total  FDI  inflows  attracted  by  India  
(Government of India ,2005).   
 
Human capital 
 
United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP’s)  global  Human Development Report 
(HDR) for 2005 ranks India at 127 out of 177 countries in terms of a composite  Human  
Development  Index  (HDI)  for  2003,  while  China  is  ranked  85  (UNDP) but India  has 
stagnated. According to the Census 2001 results, India registered a literacy rate of 64.84% 
for a country with a population of more than a billion; this is not a bad indicator but lags 
behind China’s literacy rate of 95.1% (Census of India). Alphabetisation represents 30-40 % of 
adults ,  much higher than China (UNESCO Statistical directory, 2001) .In  terms  of  Gender  
Development  Index  (GDI),  India ranks  98th,  behind  64th   ranked  China  (Government of 
India,2005) (UNDP) . This shows there are higher gender disparities in India than in China. 
For example, looking at the most important states (Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, 
West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan), 
the state with the highest literacy rate is Kerala (90.9%) with a population of 31 million 
(according to Census 2001), whereas Uttar Pradesh with a population of  166million  has  a  
literacy  rate  of  56.3%  (according  to  Census  2001),  well  below  the  all India literacy rate of 
64.84% (Census of India) . Furthermore, only 9% to 13% of the total expenditure of the 
country has been devoted toward education (Indiastat). Specifically, it has increased from 
9.7% in 2003-04 to 10.1% in 2005-06 (budget estimates) (Government of India,  
2005).  This can be attributed to the fact that the social sector falls under the state’s 
portfolio and not under the central government. 
 
India’s key advantage is in the availability of skilled, intelligent, cost-effective manpower, and 
large English speaking community. For example, consider the Indian software industry. 
Some of the key statistics of India’s ICT manpower are defined as follows (NASSCOM): 
The IT  industry employs more than 800k professionals in companies related to   software   
exports,   software-domestic,   software-captive   in   user   organizations. The overall 
median age of the software professional is about 27.5 years. 81% of all the software 
professionals have graduate or higher degrees. But one can  find  them  only  in  areas  
where  opportunities  exist,  infrastructure  is  well-developed, business  opportunities  are  
abundant  and  much  regionalized,  i.e.,  exist  in  cities  such  as Mumbai, Bangalore, Delhi, 
Noida, Calcutta, Pune. According to results of the 60th  round of NSSO  survey  (Jan-Jun  
2004),  about  72%  of  the  households  belonged  to  rural  India  and accounted  for  nearly  
75%  of  total  population.  In the rural areas, about 66% of usually employed males and 84% 
of usually employed females are engaged in the agricultural sector (Government of India, 
2005). Unemployment rates went up between 1993-94 and 2004. It can be safely said that 
keeping  the  political  scenario  aside,  India  has  to  invest  more  in  the  development  of  the 
educational system and creation of business opportunities. 
 
 
1. GOAL OF THE PAPER 
 
Several papers have discussed India from the point of view of a wireless service and product 
market, and sometimes tried to assess quantitative attributes thereof. This is not the intent of 
the present paper which aims instead at looking from a management point of view at the 
unique underlying evolution processes, bottlenecks and risks.  
 
For example, just to illustrate highlights of these unique attributes , it is indeed surprising that 
such a major economy with its very large population has not yet achieved the wireless service 
usage and mobile terminal penetration ratios of neither an early European adopter ,nor of a 
recent large scale adopter like China or Russia (Sangwan & Pau, 2005) . 
 
India has also been characterised by a surprising regulatory development process quite 
different from many other contexts, both in terms of its both centralised and regional 
structure, of absence of technology neutrality. At the same time, a very large fraction of the 
population has not for affordability and regional coverage reasons been able to get the access 
opportunities of more developed regions, leading to a distribution unbalance which is also a 
significant opportunity. Recently foreign and domestic investors have grown a 
proportionately large appetite for early phase wireless operators in India. Last but not least, 
the wireless service and product adoption pattern in India, specific to communication 
services, has so far been in rather sharp contrast with the widely known software and 
outsourcing services industry evolutions. 
 
 
Therefore it is important to compare the most relevant known wireless service and product 
adoption theories, to establish from facts whether they apply in the Indian context, and, if not, 
suggest a new or mixed theory able to explain all such facts and cast some light into its likely 
future structural evolution. It is of high relevance in management to validate if indeed 
established models apply or not in a significant case like India, just as it is also of high 
relevance for the main stakeholders to identify methodology able to support their analyses. 
 
Finally the applicability of such a new or mixed theory to other technology sectors of 
the Indian economy must be assessed. 
 
 
2. RELEVANT TRADITIONAL MODELS 
 
 
This Section reviews relevant business models from the litterature in terms of their 
relevance for the Indian wireless service and product adoption. 
  
 
1) ABSORPTION BUSINESS MODEL 
 
Conceptually, wireless successes hinge on how well users and businesses can absorb pertinent 
information and apply the knowledge they have gained towards meeting social needs, and 
developing products and services. The success of innovating products and services requires 
critical investments in the accumulation of knowledge (Kanter, 1983), (Rogers, 1983), (Cohe 
and Levinthal, 1990) (Stock, Greiss and Fisher, 2001).  
A community's absorptive capacity, i.e. the ability to recognize and assimilate information 
and apply its cumulative knowledge towards a social or profit gain, defines this ability. (Zahra 
and George,2002,p.186)  define absorptive capacity as a "set of organizational outlines and 
processes by which firms or individuals acquire , assimilate , transform and exploit 
knowledge to produce a dynamic organisational capability"  .As more knowledge is 
accumulated the organisation’s absorptive capacity grows as its ability to recognize and 
assimilate information expands . 
 
  
To explain the growth of wireless services and products  in India from this theory , one 
hypothesis  is that India has had , thanks to education and social structure , a greater 
absorptive capacity than some other large emerging economies, and that, as a result , it will be 
more innovative ,but will also more accurately meet and satisfy customer needs . However 
sofar the absorptive capacity has been very small for products, industrial development, and 
value added services and in the rural areas of the country, which to some extent invalidates 
this hypothesis .Also it is unclear if there has been any impact on the organizational 
absorptive capacity. 
 
2) PERCEIVED BENEFITS BUSINESS MODEL 
 
In this typical  model used in the communications industry  , perceived benefits refer to the 
anticipated advantages that an innovation can provide to a community or organization ,and  
impact IT and communication services adoption .As communities are motivated by the 
perceived benefits from the adoption of an innovation , they realize the need to use the 
technology fully and integrate it with existing applications .Once the organization is 
convinced of the relative advantages , it tends to allocate the managerial , financial and 
technological resources necessary for the adoption .The availability  of the necessary 
resources including the technical infrastructure also facilitates higher technical knowledge , 
which in turn increases the use of assimilation .  
 
To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one 
hypothesis would be that the public and business interests have identified the perceived 
benefits and taken the needed action .However, the late and slightly perturbed regulatory 
framework for wireless service deployment and investments, seem to invalidate this 
hypothesis in the early phases of wireless service deployment up to approximately 2003.  
 
 
3) CONSUMER ATTITUDES  
 
In this theory linked to consumer behavior, its is the benefits as perceived by potential end 
users on the basis of their information , which drive the latent demand until other stakeholders 
create the knowledge , regulatory and investment frameworks to satisfy it . This is especially 
important for value added services; as shown by (Liao, 2005) from survey data (including for 
India) the consumer perceived usefulness, ease of use, behavioral control and reliability all 
positively influencee consumer’s intentions to use SMS. To explain the growth of wireless 
services and products in India from this theory ,one hypothesis is that the information access 
in India about end user benefits from wireless voice and SMS has been strong enough to fuel 
the implementation through India’s democratic processes .But the same survey has also 
shown  that subjective social norm does not influence the consumers intention to use SMS 
and that the behaviour of other people has little impact in the case of mobile SMS ;even if 
SMS does not represent all wireless basic services it has globally been so far a strong 
adoption force mostly amongst youth .Furthermore Indian industry does not yet have a 
tradition for responding to consumer demands for public services , transport and housing . 
This web of facts seems to invalidate this hypothesis in the Indian case. 
 
 
4) GLOBALISATION BUSINESS MODEL 
 
India is one of the leading emerging markets in the world today. Developed economies 
view India as a major destination for expansion, offshore research and development. Thus 
the global and historic business model just reflects domestic as well as foreign will to 
extend the capabilities and reach of wireless services and products in India like 
everywhere else under competitive rules set by WTO. The end result should be the 
minimum average global connectivity of any economic actor and user in India.  
The  issue  of  finding  the  relationship  between  communications   service  adoption  and  
economic growth  has  been  studied  by  researchers  in  different  environments.  (Kala  and  
Vardharajan ,2003)  study  the  relationship  between  telecommunications  and  the  
economic  growth  for developing  nations.; that  study  finds  that  traditional  economic  
factors  explain  demand  for main phone lines, not for the cellular phone services. The total 
impact of telecom penetration on the total output is however significantly lower for 
developing countries than that reported for OECD countries.  (Hudson ,2004)’s  study  
gives  a  broad  overview  of  how  to  get  to broadband from lessons learned from the 
wireless explosion and expansion of telecommunications networks. (Hong,  2004) 
empirically establishes the relationship between GDP, employment, illiteracy rate, and 
population density as the relevant factors that influence telecom development in twelve provinces of 
China.  
 
 
Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Indian and Chinese Telecom Industry 
Source: TRAI Report No. 1/2005, available at http://www.trai.gov.in 
 
  India China 
Fixed Lines (million) 49.75 (as of Mar 06) 325.40 (as of Mar 05) 
Cellular Lines (million) 90 (as of Mar 06) 349.10 (as of Mar 05) 
Total Revenue (billion) $17.78 (est. Mar 05) $65.30 (as of Dec 04) 
ARPU   
Basic Services $15  (as of Mar 05) $9.17  (as of Dec 04)
Mobile (GSM and CDMA) $9.04 (as of Mar 05) $9.69 (as of Dec 04) 
Competitive Position   
Basic Services .67 (as of Dec 04) .58 (as of Dec 04) 
Mobile Services .16 (as of Dec 04) .40 (as of Dec 04) 
OpEx per Subscriber   
Basic Service $5.92 $4.30 
Mobile Service $4.18 $2.41 
 
Table 2 illustrates the key differences in variables when comparing the Indian and 
Chinese telecommunications industry: 
 
Fixed and Mobile Connections: It is clear that the Chinese market has seen a higher growth 
rate when compared to the Indian market. In the last five to six years, India’s telecom 
growth rate has been more than that of China.  This was largely possible due to policy changes, 
namely,   introduction   of   new   telecommunications   policy,   competitions,   and   growth   in 
the economy due to which the purchasing power of people has increased. India has 
become the fifth  largest  telephone  network  in  the  world  after  China,  USA,  Japan,  and  
Germany. According to Mr. Dayanidhi Maran, Minister of Communications and IT, India, it 
is expected that at the end of 2007 there will be 250million telephone lines (fixed and 
mobile) in India, with a teledensity of 22%. 
 
Total  Revenue  and  OpEx/Subscribers:  Total  revenues  of  Indian  service  providers  are  low 
when compared to Chinese telecom players. Operational expenditures are higher for 
Indian operators when compared with their Chinese counterparts. This is expected because 
currently operators  in  India  are  looking  to  build  networks,  expand  to  new  geographical  
areas,  costs associated with customer acquisition are higher, and so is the marketing cost. 
 
ARPU: ARPU’s are comparable in the mobile service segment but in case of fixed 
services, India is much higher than China (Sangwan & Pau, 2005). 
 
 
To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one 
hypothesis is that government and regulatory bodies have helped in improving the 
communications infrastructure everywhere and has offered incentives and/or transparent rules 
for competition to unfold. The National Telecommunications Policy, 1999 (NTP ‘99) was the 
first major initiative by the government in reviving the telecom industry in India. NTP ‘99 
was targeted toward improving the nation’s teledensity and network infrastructure. These 
policies and licenses have helped India to engage competition in the information highway 
market and help, to some extent, in increasing   the   penetration.   However,   penetration   is   
still   far   behind   major   developing economies in the world.  In  last  50  years,  total  teledensity  
growth  rate  is  1.92% (TRAI : Telecom Regulatory authority of India ,2005) , which is very 
low even  if  has  soared  from  0.5%  in  1991  to  12.73%  in  2006,  but  so  has  the population 
of the county (1.02bn, according to (Census 2001)) . In the case of India, (Rai and Lal 
,2000) identify that growth in information society depends on  socio-economic  
development,  education,  telecommunication,  and  media  as  the  factors contributing to the 
growth of the gross domestic product of a country. Furthermore, the article discusses the 
position of India in different sectors that are an integral part of the information revolution. 
(Gupta ,2004)’s  work  reveals  that  government  efforts  in  resolving  the  regulatory  and  legal 
uncertainties are not always enabling the government to achieve public interest goals. (Press 
et. al. ,2003) compare  China  and  India  on  the  six  dimension  framework:  
pervasiveness,  geographic dispersion,  organization  infrastructure,  connectivity  
infrastructure,  sectoral  absorption,  and sophistication of use; their study finds that China 
continues to have a substantial lead over India in Internet diffusion. More generally, 
(Sangmoon, 2005)’s research identifies that market and technological factors have a great 
impact on the explosive diffusion speed, while government and social factors contribute less 
to the diffusion process. All these studies for wireless as well as other communication 
services adoption seem to invalidate to a large extent the stated hypothesis. 
 
 
5) BRAND MANAGEMENT BUSINESS MODEL  
 
Brand management in India has been very strong in the mobile area. Operators built brand 
equity, and the choice of symbols and media whereby they have added or subtracted from 
customers’ perceived value of the brand was done; as the choice was rather narrow, the task 
was eased.  
To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one 
hypothesis is that efficient brand and relatively easy brand management contributed 
significantly to this growth. Although studies on brand impact in India in the communications 
area are very few, they point at a high impact not matched however outside affluent layers in 
the society by any wireless service adoption .In other words, this hypothesis can maybe 
explain in parts the high adoption rate in the more affluent groups in the society, but is 
overridden for the rest of the population by affordability constraints.   
 
3. IDENTIFIED UNIQUE MODELS  
 
Amongst those unique service and product adoption structural drivers which have been 
identified, the following seem to have the highest explanatory contribution to the justification 
of the past and current situation : 
 
India can appear as a case in two-tier migration ,not towards an under-developed deployment 
coexisting with a normal adoption (like in many countries) ,but towards a situation involving  
growth in both  wireless services  (mostly in coastal cities ) and in converged fixed +fixed 
wireless  services  (mostly in the countryside) . 
 
India can appear as a case in limited domestic telecommunications infrastructure and 
terminals domestic industries , largely outweighed by strong and global presence in 
information processing service support (software , outsourcing , etc )  ; this is e.g. in sharp 
contract to Japan , China and Taiwan  India can appear as a wireless service and product 
evolution with growth but also strong drivers towards a downturn , with minimal support and 
a lot of constraints   by governments  whose influence has been  rather fragmented in time and 
scope .India can appear as a case in which wireless services (cellular, fixed wireless ,etc..) 
appear to be  a knowledge sharing and productivity tool ,and not as a manufacturing 
employment contributor .India can appear as a case of a market where , despite a  rather 
favourable merger and acquisition framework  ,  foreign networks operators have been more 
followers than initiators  
 
1) TWO TIER MIGRATION MODEL 
 
In most significant wireless service and product adoption markets, like China, Russia, 
Mexico, Egypt and others, the technology selection of wireless was seen as a way to leapfrog 
additional investments and slow provisioning in fixed or fixed broadband telephony. Indian 
regulators and policy makers are planning to up the ante by implementing policies 
that will lead to an additional 150m telephone lines being installed by the end of 2007 
; this will lead to an approximate fixed-line subscriber base of 50m, with the 
remaining 200m being either fixed-wireless or mobile subscribers .The country’s 
Communications Minister announced that the government is targeting 250m telephony 
subscribers by 2007, seeking to increase teledensity to 22 percent largely with higher 
fixed line penetration.  
 
Such policies, and facts below, confirm that in India the migration to wireless services 
(cellular and fixed wireless) co-exists with continued growth in the fixed segment, 
and in the future with fixed broadband. 
 
An unusually high percentage of the country’s population, about 72 percent, resides in 
rural areas, compared to 58 percent in Indonesia and 60 percent in China. More 
importantly, India’s rural GDP per capita is much lower at US$352 compared to 
US$765 in China. Since a significant portion of growth would likely have to come 
from the country’s rural areas, for India to achieve its vision of 200 million mobile 
subscriptions, return on investment (ROI) becomes a major issue. Coverage expansion 
in rural areas, where the terrain is rough, has proven in many instances to be an 
expensive proposition. Moreover, the inability of the rural user to pay as much for 
services as the urban poses another equally serious problem. There are over 550,000 
villages with less than 5,000 people residing in them. None of these have any mobile 
coverage as of today. Moreover, only 2,500 of India’s roughly 5,200 towns are 
covered by mobile networks. With population coverage of only 22 percent, the issue of 
increasing teledensity in the country is not only capacity related, but also a problem of 
coverage, requiring a great deal of investment from the operators. Although equipment 
vendors have begun developing unique products, such as site-less and shelter-less radio 
base stations, which help operators reduce the total cost of network ownership, we 
still believe that the capital investment required to blanket a significant portion of the 
country (above 50%) is not within the means of any single operator. As such, a 
significant shift in policy, such as telecom authorities in the country allowing network 
sharing in rural areas, is required to increase population coverage and eventually 
teledensity, over such a short period of time. 
 
But noteworthy enough, there is still strong growth in fixed subscriptions, with an aggregate 
increase of 117 % between 1995 and 2000. Fixed-line telephony which had given way to 
mobile phones is now back in focus. Most of the integrated players including Reliance, 
Bharti Televentures and BSNL are betting big on wireline phones and are rolling-out 
optical fiber cables with copper in the last mile across the country. While Reliance 
Infocomm (Reliance) said that fixed-lines would become the company's mainstay in the long 
run, Bharti Televentures (Bharti) has spread its fixed-line network to 14 circles from five. 
State-owned BSNL is set to issue a major tender for installing IP-based network across all 
its major exchanges around the country. Even MTNL, which operates in Delhi and Mumbai, 
is introducing new features, such as picture messaging and ring tones on its fixed-line 
terminals to make it more attractive to consumers who have opted for mobile service. 
 
Furthermore mobile,  fixed or fixed wireless  deployment in rural India has a user multiplier 
to it, in that each installed line can serve many more thanks to the “village operator “ effect 
(so called Village Panchayat Telephones, or sometimes walking mobile operators ) . They 
often charge twice the operators rates to people using their mobile terminals; out of the profit 
they repay loans and consume .The average village phone bill is about twice the average 
urban mobile ARPU .The western operators which have invested in local operators running 
such village services (such as Telenor's 51 % stake in Grameen Telecom in Bangladesh) have 
been quite satisfied. TRAI, WorldTel, Rutel (Canada) has long been pushing for subsidies to 
rural telecommunications; most active operator following this seems to be BNSL. Joint 
distribution with banks offering micro-lending has been a success .As of 2003, total number 
was about 500 000 (http://www.bsnl.co.in/vptstatus.htm). New York Life insurance company 
has a license in India which obligates it to sell policies to the rural and disadvantaged; so it 
went for India's rich network of self-help and civic groups selling combos of phones and life 
insurance to institutions like fishermen's co-ops. The year 2007 is touted to be the year of ICT 
- rural connectivity, broadband, 3G, enterprise and entertainment bulge, mobile content, e-
governance, increase in PC penetration, Information Security and telemedicine etc. It would 
also be the year, which will see telecom expanding into rural areas connecting possibly all the 
six-lakh villages. There is a Mission 2007 that promises to set up a Knowledge Centre in 
every village. That means some six lakh village knowledge centers with PCs, printers; web 
cameras, broadband connection, and power back up and so on. Broadband on fixed line and 
3G on wireless - these are set for convergence in 2007. That is also the year when central 
government expects its e-governance set up to being on the road to completion. And state 
governments would set up their data networks SWAN to reach all block headquarters.  
 
Then there would be additions in the entertainment sector: digital television in more homes, 
better cable with some at least becoming interactive. On-line education, telemedicine, more 
content on mobile phones, enterprise services, IT applications in financial services, e-
commerce….  
 
 
 2) LARGE SCALE IMPORTED ADOPTION WITHOUT A 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND TERMINALS 
INDUSTRY 
 
Despite the user and usage growth summarized in Section 0  , India today is a large net 
importer of almost all knowledge-intensive communications infrastructure and mobile 
terminals .Taking wireless networks alone (and except for physical buildings ,cables and 
power) , it is estimated that the operator usage revenues after government taxes cover a 92 % 
import quote for such systems . This is in a way quite an accomplishment only comparable 
amongst large economies to Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria and a few others. This shows that 
India is a significant case, although far from unique, of a large scale adoption without a native 
telecommunications infrastructure and terminals industry. Royalty and license fees receipts in 
2002 represented 1/10 th of China’s , high tech exports represent only 5 % of manufactured 
exports (compared to China 23 %) while manufactured trade itself is only at 13 % of GDP 
(2002) and total expenditure for R&D was 0,78 % of GDP in 2001 ( factor almost three less 
than China) (Worldbank) . Furthermore, since 1993-94 till 2005-06, according to data by 
Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) , the average  production  of  “telephone  instruments”  
in India stands at 4.84 million (Indiastat) . This shows that there are not enough domestic 
equipment manufacturers to cater to the needs. Having indigenous equipment manufacturers 
can help in reducing  equipment  cost  as  well  as  monthly  rental  cost,  ensure  faster  
delivery  of  goods, improve  quality  of  services,  and  overall,  increase  the  faith  of  the  
consumers  in  buying  the goods. 
 
In effect, India has lagged behind as a manufacturing center for communications systems and 
products (even falling behind other Asian countries), mainly because of infrastructure 
problems, and government regulations. And the few design or manufacturing centers are 
mostly foreign : Alcatel and partner ITI have opened a GSM infrastructure manufacturing 
plant in India , with CRM and test facilities (IEEE  2006) ; Texas Instruments and Freescale 
Semiconductor India Pvt (in Noida) develop a single phone chip ,  MXC Mobile extreme 
convergence architecture , and parts of Motorola Razr and Rokr cell phones ; NXP (ex-
Phillips Semiconductor)  India (in Bangalore) participate in a multimedia mobile processor ; 
Itiam Systems Pvt (in Bangalore) develop wireless ASICs ; HCL Technologies does design 
work for the IBM Power PC architecture family ,alongside IBM Bangalore ; SemIndia fab in 
Bangalore produces mobile phone chips outsourced by Broadcom ;Sony Ericsson will soon 
have manufacturing and some design in India .  Although most potentially interested 
manufacturers back down early due to India's notorious distribution challenge , some like LG 
Electronics India have succeeded by going deeper into rural territories ,and serving at sales 
end  users there which tend to pay a premium for quality and service, but only if they can 
afford the price .Some other companies want to use more the skills base to take advantage of 
the country's abundant supply of engineers .Companies that make the effort now to source and 
manufacture products in India may obtain first-mover advantages such as close relations with 
most suppliers , access to talent and government support :the fields of low cost mobile 
terminals, as well as of cabling and interconnect assemblies in telecoms infrastructure, are 
two important such areas ,in that the testing effort / design effort is high . Two high-profile 
multinationals, Intel and J. P. Morgan Chase, have announced their intention to move more 
skill-intensive operations to India. In back end telecoms, BSS or OSS, almost no such 
transfers have happened from abroad, largely due to legal and bureaucratic reasons 
 
Similar lily, due to a slow reform in the domestic Indian financial system, there are far less 
Indian VC firms (today only about 30), but far more mergers and acquisitions or floats on the 
capital markets. Examples of Indian VC’s active in telecommunications include: Sabeer 
Bhatia, Yogesh Patel, and Shiraz Kanga. The Indian VC’s have mostly a flow of outbound 
investments, and give in this way evidence of their dependability and survivability to their 
main American or European clients. The conglomerates and operators do the same; e.g. not 
only does the Tata Group (14.2 Billion USD 2004/2005 turnover, or 2.6 % of GDP) ¨hold 46 
% stake in VSNL, India’s incumbent international and national carrier. But Tata now also 
wants to invest in foreign operations like Tyco Global Networks (US) sub sea cable 
connection, Teleglobe International Holdings (Canada). Now VSNL International is targeting 
international wholesale and multinational enterprise markets (with or without call 
terminations in India), besides Teleglobe's large voice carrier volume .Indian high tech 
investments abroad of 3, 5 BUSD exceeded high tech India inbound investments in 2005. In 
the field of software and outsourcing services, in which India is a key player, Tata R&D and 
design centre (Pune), Tata Consultancy services (TCS), Infosys, Motorola India Electronics 
Ltd (MIEL) (Bangalore) have become a prime supplier to foreign mobile infrastructure 
suppliers. Nevertheless, such Indian subcontractors receive increased competition from 
established global R&D or IT service companies, and suffer from a shortage of workers fluent 
in european languages other than English .They are slow to raise beyond their roots and slow 
in building global organizations that can serve the telco infrastructure and operator segments 
with higher value added services (The McKinsey Quarterly, 2005) 
 
 
There is an almost never mentioned area of difficulties for the telecommunications industry in 
India, in that often patents there are granted to scientists at a conceptual level ,and they 
challenge specific design innovations by core suppliers .Under a British law and judicial 
system in India , and with bureaucratic hurdles , legal cases and disputes take far too long to 
resolve .The result is that essentially foreign players and domestic ones alike cannot rely on 
Indian IPR and that work for hire must be sole-ownership type to the funding party . 
 
3) UNSTABLE ADOPTION WITH LACK OF COHERENT PUBLIC 
POLICIES  
 
 
Ironically, India's telecommunications industry often has been cited as an example of how 
deregulation can unshackle growth. It has been one of the biggest corporate-success stories 
since the government opened the sector to private investment in the 1990s, in part, because it 
was one of the first sectors in India opened to foreign ownership. The government in 2006 
lifted the foreign-shareholding cap for telecommunications companies to 74% from 49%; 
New Delhi has yet to clarify the circumstances under which the foreigners are allowed to 
invest.  But a recurrence of familiar old problems, regulatory roadblocks and foot-dragging by 
state-owned competitors (called “babus”), is threatening at times to cool expansion in India's 
wireless sector and is frustrating telecommunications investors. Phone-company executives 
want Indian regulators to make it easier to expand and to pressure the national state-run phone 
service BSNL to take steps needed to give millions of new private-network subscribers’ 
access to the state-owned network. Consumers in some cities complain that the quality of 
their service is deteriorating, with a rising number of dropped calls and lousy reception. 
Meanwhile, wireless operators aren't earning in as much revenue as they should because 
unplanned growth, connectivity problems are jamming up networks and making it tougher to 
sell value-added services such as those that let users download games. All private operators 
say they need state-owned BSNL to keep up if growth rates and service quality are to be 
maintained and improved.  
 
In 2005, Indian mobile operators have fallen woefully short of the government’s goal 
for 2007. They added a mere 4 M mobile subscribers during 1Q2005, and an 
additional 3 M were added in the following two months. This takes the total mobile 
subscriber base in the country to 55 M, far away from where it should be if it were to 
add 152 M before the end of 2007. If the regulatory regime is unable to immediately 
provide additional 2G spectrum to the country’s operators and/or decides to levy a 
large license fee to award 3G spectrum, Pyramid Research believes that Indian 
operators will add a mere 54 M over 2005-2007, this will take the country’s mobile 
subscriber base to 102 M by 2007: almost 50 percent less than the government’s stated 
objective. 
 
One of the largest hurdles to overcome for operators is the issue of adequate 
spectrum. Currently, the average amount of spectrum awarded to an Indian GSM 
operator is between 4.4-10 MHz, while a CDMA operator receives between 2.5-5 MHz, 
amount considerably less than international benchmarks for both technologies. This 
has frequently led to, and will continue to result in inadequate planning and network 
building by operators. Operators need at least an additional 10-15 MHz swath of 
spectrum to ramp up capacity to meet the 200m objective. Moreover, because the 
Finance Ministry recently suggested that 3G spectrum should be sold to operators for a 
license fee of up to US$350 M, there is a doubt about the ability of Indian operators 
(even with foreign investment and backing) to finance their growth plans given the 
fact that their next allotment of spectrum might come at a hefty price tag. Regulators 
and politicians have been squabbling about which service providers deserve more spectrum 
and how they should pay for it. Some companies say spectrum should be auctioned off, while 
others say it should be allocated equally and paid for through revenue-sharing with the 
government. Still others want bandwidth to be allotted at a set price to only the largest 
operators that need it most.  
 
 
The final obstacle to achieving 200 M subscribers by 2007 is the fact that Indian 
operators face some of the highest telecom levies in the world, particularly among 
mobile carriers within developing markets. Service and general sales taxes, license 
fees, spectrum charges and universal fund obligations can account for anywhere from 
15-24 percent of an operator’s gross revenue in India. On the other hand, operators in 
countries such as China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are usually charged between 2-4 
percent of their revenues in regulatory taxes and levies. Moreover, the 15-24 percent 
paid by Indian operators is on top of the Access Deficit Charge (ADC) - a fee of 
between 5-25 percent added on to per-minute tariffs to finance the development of 
fixed-line networks in the country. These exorbitant fees levied by the government 
continue to stunt the network build out plans of the country’s operators, dampening the 
prospects of an industry expected to showcase high growth rates. 
 
 
4) KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT 
ADOPTION MODEL WITHOUT MANUFACTURING CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
In Section 3 it was already established that the communications service and product creation 
and manufacturing are playing only a very modest role towards the adoption of wireless 
services and products in India. The question however remains in terms of development model 
if this adoption was and is fueled by knowledge sharing and productivity enhancement alone. 
 
In World Bank's Knowledge economy index ranking, India still ranks very low (about value 3 
on scale of 10) (www.worldbank.org/kam) .Nevertheless, especially international 
organizations using the World Bank, “Knowledge Assessment Methodology,” 
http://www.worldbank.org./KAM. have repeatedly pointed out at the Indian knowledge based 
economy’s strength (Dahlman & Utz, 2004). In so doing, however, the concept is used more 
broadly to cover how any economy harnesses and uses new and existing knowledge to 
improve the productivity of agriculture, industry, and services and increase overall welfare. In 
India, great potential exists for increasing productivity by shifting labour from low 
productivity and subsistence activities in agriculture, informal industry, and informal service 
activities to more productive modern sectors, as well as to new knowledge-based activities, 
and in so doing, to reduce poverty and touch every member of society. The NTP National 
Telecom Policy of 1999 For  the  first  time also  recognized  the  importance  of  telecom  
services  for  the social   and   economic   development   of   the   country (TRAI , 1999) .India 
should continue to leverage its strengths to become a leader in knowledge creation and use. 
India has other intrinsic advantages, such as macroeconomic stability, a large domestic 
market, and a large and relatively low-cost and skilled workforce. It also has a critical mass of 
well-educated workers in engineering and science and, unlike China, abundant raw materials. 
India is still a relatively closed economy compared with other Asian economies, in which 
exports account for a much larger share of GDP (33 percent in China and 38 percent in the 
Republic of Korea, compared with only 15 percent in India in 2003). 
 
There is a major difference between the types of network supported information content in 
rural and urban areas. In rural areas the need for communications is mostly related to 
emergency and social reasons , such as getting in touch with relatives at home and abroad or 
calling medical assistance .Economic activities rely still on personal contacts; however as 
mobile communication is well suited for this purpose, it has a large latent  following for this 
use in Indian rural areas. Significant opportunities exist in information about agricultural 
input and output prices , basic banking and micro-loan opportunities, export regulation and 
law , weather forecasts , transport facilities including bus schedules, new agricultural 
techniques affecting production (World Bank, 2000) Creating new community services may 
happen fastest in : education and training , healthcare, environmental monitoring and 
emergency early warning ,entertainment (EU, 2001) . 
 
In the urban areas, the knowledge economy is driven by businesses of all sizes and in all 
sectors, which all use wireless and satellite communications extensively, largely to reduce 
transaction costs and lowering the barriers of time and space. A recently rapidly growing 
dimension of the knowledge economy is the sudden explosion in R&D ; whereas in most 
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
private sector finances 50–60 percent of R&D, because it increasingly has the finance, 
knowledge, and personnel needed for technological innovation,  in India, some 70 percent of 
R&D is performed by the central and state governments, an additional 27 percent by 
enterprises (both public and private sector industries), and less than 3 percent by universities 
and other higher education institutions.  
 
Fierce price competition has resulted in Indian mobile telephony rates becoming one of the 
cheapest in the world. India's charges per minute are said to be the lowest in the world, as 
service providers offer deals that include a lifetime of unlimited incoming calls for a one-time 
fee of 1,000 rupees ($21.75)."Everybody can afford it," said T. V. Ramachandran, director 
general of the Cellular Operators Association — "the teawallah, the dhobi and the 
sabsiwallah," conjuring up the traditional tea vendor, launderer and vegetable seller. Bharti 
Airtel’s charges average national average of 3 UScents /min. Subscribers are responding to 
offerings like the Don't Stop Mobile plan of Tata Teleservices, which includes a handset and 
unlimited talk time for two years for just over US$30. The mobile terminal maker Nokia 
recently introduced a mobile handset model costing the equivalent of US$43.50, its lowest 
price globally for the handset, in partnership with Reliance Communication, one of India's 
largest telephone service providers. This has been a boon, mostly in urban areas but especially 
to people in India’s 550,000 rural villages, which have had no access to communication 
through traditional means, such as fixed lines. But now, from fishermen at sea and brokers 
ashore in Kerala to farmers in Punjab—people in industry and farming are embracing wireless 
technology for economic activity, to do business, and to increase their profit margins.  
 
India can also boast of better known remarkable and impressive global achievements in the IT 
sector; according to the National Association of Software and Services Companies 
(NASSCOM), the Indian IT market reached $19.9 billion in 2003–04, accounting for about 
3.82 percent of India’s GDP in 2003–04 and providing employment for almost a million 
people. India’s IT services are moving up the value chain, and India is now undertaking new 
and innovative work, such as the management for clients of IT-related business processes. It 
is making an impact also in IT consulting, in which companies such as Wipro, Infosys, and 
Tata are managing IT networks for foreign companies and re-engineering business processes.  
 
The real challenge is to promote the effective application and use of ICTs throughout the 
economy to raise productivity and growth, not just in a few pockets. Ensuring that the benefits 
of ICTs are shared by all requires an enabling environment for ICTs. Critical elements include 
increasing access to ICTs through widespread availability of telephones, increasingly 
including mobile phones, computers, and connectivity to the Internet; enhancing ICT literacy 
and skills among the population, more so in the rural areas; and developing ICT applications 
that can provide much-needed social, economic, and government services to citizens.  
 
Indian operators are aiming to roll out 3G even before earlier generation services like GPRS 
take off. The country's telecom regulator is already beavering away on issues like the price of 
3G licenses, the allocation of spectrum and how much companies can charge for value-added 
services, and now it has allowed Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., Mahanagar Telephone Nigam 
Ltd., Bharti Airtel and Hutchison Essar Ltd. to use 3G spectrum to test equipment in 
anticipation of a launch probably in 2007. Optimists say India can leapfrog slower-bandwidth 
tech with a speedy launch of 3G. But there are some questions whether India is really jumping 
ahead of the curve or blindly following in the footsteps of operators in more developed 
markets. The tale of high-end data, games, video downloads and Bollywood movies on your 
mobile, will only appeal to the “happy few”. But 3G as a revenue booster in India is far-
fetched at this time .On the upside, freeing up the 3G band may alleviate a spectrum shortage, 
but it may hurt low end users. 
 
It can be concluded that the knowledge sharing and productivity enhancement model is 
starting to impact selectively Indian adoption of wireless services and products as both an 
enabler and a result of needs.  
 
 
5) LATE FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS INTO A LARGE EMERGING 
MARKET 
 
One established business model for large emerging markets is the one where foreign capital 
investments , when accepted , has fueled the adoption of communication services by taking 
either a longer term pay-back view or the view to establish a strong foothold early enough at 
lower costs .  FCI is not,  or has not been welcome for a long time (except with minority 
shares) , in major markets like China, Russia , Indonesia ,  FCI   has driven up the availability 
of wireless services and products in many places such as Central and South America, Africa , 
Vietnam , Pakistan and others . 
The paradox with India has been that FCI in the communications sector with significant or 
majority stakes, has only be authorized so late that it could not boost the adoption of services 
and infrastructure deployment ,and furthermore that it had to cope with low ROI due to the 
competitive rates set previously . Up until 2005 the direct foreign shareholding ceiling was 49 
% ,now raised to 74 % .Only in Internet services was 100 % FCI authorized since 1999 
(TRAI,1999) . As a matter of fact, some foreign early small stake investors had to leave due 
to too low ROI and bureaucratic hurdles. In 2003, Vodafone exited the Indian market and its 
21 % share in RPG Cellular , to re-enter late in 2005 with a 10 % stake in Bharti Tele 
Ventures (about 1.5 BUSD)   ,making it the largest foreign investment in India , valuing 
customers at 990 USD/subscriber .But for all the price it paid for this stake, Vodafone,  was 
since 2005 till early 2007 only  the second foreign investor in the company, next to Singapore 
Telecom ,which has thrice the stake with 30,7 %  .The Mittal founder family has no intent of 
giving up control via their control over Bharti Telecom, itself largest shareholder in Bharti 
Tele Ventures . To add up to the FCI gyrations, recently Vodafone  took over a large share in 
Hutchinson Essar in competition with a domestic conglomerate ,but the price/subscriber still 
outstrips by a very large factor the average ARPU so the only motivation can be business 
focussed value added services only . 
 
Since  Aug  1991  to  Sep  2005,  the  telecommunications  sector  has  attracted  a cumulative 
inflow of Rs. 12,076 crore (US $2,863 million), which amounts to 9.60% of the total  FDI  
inflows  attracted  by  India  (Government of India,2005). The  electrical  equipment  sector  
(including computer software and electronics) attracted Rs. 20, 898 Crore (US $4,862 M), a 
share of 16.62%  in  the  total  FDI  inflows  (Government of India,2005).  Between  Aug  
1991  to  Aug  2004,  looking  at  the Service/Item-wise  actual  inflow  of  FDI  in  the  
telecom  sector,  cellular  mobile  telephone services has attracted 28.87%, holding 
companies, 47.13%, basic telephony services, 3.83%, manufacturing  &  consultancy,  
15.36%,  and  Cable  TV  Network  +  Internet,  1.69%  (Indiastat) (Department of 
Telecommunications) . 
 
4. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE RELEVANT BUSINESS 
MODELS 
 
This paper has sofar reviewed ten business models for the adoption of wireless services and 
products in India , of which half are traditional one’s while the last five are specific or unique 
relevant processes . The assessments are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
Business model or effect  Relevance for India  
ABSORPTION BUSINESS MODEL Largely invalid 
PERCEIVED BENEFITS BUSINESS 
MODEL 
Invalid until approx. 2003 ; valid 
thereafter 
CONSUMER ATTITUDES Not valid 
GLOBALISATION  BUSINESS 
MODEL 
 
Largely invalid 
BRAND MANAGEMENT BUSINESS 
MODEL 
Only valid for affluent groups in society 
TWO TIER MIGRATION MODEL 
 
Valid and not sustainable 
LARGE SCALE IMPORTED  
ADOPTION WITHOUT A 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
TERMINALS INDUSTRY 
 
Valid sofar and not sustainable 
UNSTABLE ADOPTION WITH 
LACK OF COHERENT PUBLIC 
POLICIES  
Valid sofar and not sustainable  
KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND 
PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT 
ADOPTION MODEL WITHOUT 
MANUFACTURING 
Slowly emerging but risky 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
LATE FOREIGN CAPITAL 
INVESTMENTS  INTO A LARGE 
EMERGING MARKET 
Valid sofar despite recent events 
 
Table 3: Summary table of adoption business models and of their relevance in 
the Indian case 
 
  
In view of this summary it appears that most traditional and stable adoption models from 
Section 2 fail to explain in a cohesive way  the observed evolution In India across wireless 
user groups .On the contrary , most of the unique  models or other structural processes 
identified in the subsequent Section 3 seem to give a better explanation of his evolution across 
wireless user groups .However most of these  unique processes carry with them structural 
instabilities : imbalance across social groups , inconsistent public policies , weaknesses in the 
economic sectoral structure ,and sectoral balance of payment problems . 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The combined result is an overall quite fragile adoption and deployment path with growing 
tensions such as coverage, quality of service and affordability disparities. Besides their usual 
instability, the unique structural processes share the characteristic of high dynamic fluctuation 
dependency which warrant some quantitative modelling via system dynamics; however the 
underlying phenomena are so fundamental or sporadic in time that the approximation quality 
would be doubtful.  
 
The specific or unique characteristics prove that the adoption may only get sustainable if three 
conditions are jointly met:  
 
• Stable transparent technology neutral regulations offering domestic and foreign 
investments alike a reasonable return even in a non growth scenario ; 
• The exploitation of the potential of the rural areas with lower cost infrastructure and 
tariffing packages , with backbone infrastructure sharing and possibly some build-
operate-lease back arrangements for faster deployment 
• A reorientation of Indian industry towards tapping the growth opportunities ,once 
sustainable equilibrium margins  can be reached, including turning into export 
opportunities instead of just being a large net importer   
 
The lesson applies to the adoption of high technology services and products in India as 
elsewhere, that is that structural fragility and unseized opportunities deviating too much 
from a stable absorption process may jeopardize the perceived societal and business 
advantages.  
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